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Not all true beliefs count as knowledge; warrant is the technical term for the (possibly 
logically complex) property that gives you knowledge when you add it to true belief. 
Warrant is not necessarily the same as justification, or any other epistemological 
property; all that this stipulative definition seems to entail about warrant is something 
akin to the following pair of biconditionals: 
 
(1) A true belief counts as a piece of knowledge iff it is warranted. 
A warranted belief counts as a piece of knowledge iff it is true. 
 
What exactly warrant turns out to be depends upon the substantive theory of knowledge 
we adopt. It may involve a belief’s being justified and having an absence of genuine 
defeaters for that belief, a belief’s being formed through a reliable process, a belief’s 
being formed through the virtuous traits of an agent’s cognitive character, or some 
such.  
 
Some epistemologists, however, have attempted to theorize about warrant by offering 
“nonpartisan” arguments, or in other words, arguments that do not depend upon any 
substantive theory of knowledge. For example, Merricks (1995, 1997) argues for 
warrant infallibilism, the claim that a belief cannot be at once warranted and false; 
Ryan (1996), Howard-Snyder et al. (2003), and Coffman (2008) challenge his 
arguments without endorsing warrant fallibilism. Pust (2000) argues that some of the 
claims made about warrant by the philosopher who first used the term as a technical 
concept in epistemology, Alvin Plantinga, are groundless, given the stipulative 
definition of the term. Lastly, Michael Huemer (2005) tries to demonstrate several 
claims about the nature of warrant: that there is no unique warrant property, that 
warrant fallibilism is true, that some but not all warrant properties are closed under 
known logical entailment if knowledge is, and that no warrant properties are closed 
under known logical entailment if knowledge isn’t. 
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In this paper I will first summarize Huemer’s arguments and then critique his 
conclusions. Our stipulative definition of warrant needs to be modified somehow to 
eliminate some of the intuitively problematic candidates for warrant conditions that his 
analysis allows. What complicates our task is the fact that, as Huemer (p. 117) points 
out, given the way warrant is defined, it is not the kind of thing we can have clear 
intuitions about. Or in Pust’s words, “If we had the ability to make independent 
intuitive judgments about the term’s proper and improper application, there would be 
no justification, prior to analysis, for stipulating that warrant has a certain functional 
role. After all, we might find that such a characterization was mistaken,” (p. 51). All we 
can know about warrant at the outset is that it fills the functional role of making up the 
difference between knowledge and mere true belief. We may have intuitive ideas about 
what does that, but the thing that actually fills that functional role may turn out to be far 
different from what we originally thought.   
 
On to Huemer’s first argument, then. This argument attempts to show that there is no 
unique warrant property. It hinges upon the fact that for any propositions p and q, there 
is at least one proposition, r, such that (p & q) is logically equivalent to (p & r) but q is 
not logically equivalent to r (pp. 172-173). For example, let  r = (p → q), where the 
equals sign indicates logical equivalence. q is logically independent of p, whereas r is 
not; r is true only if p is false or q is true. Yet (p & r) = (p & (p → q)) = (p & q), so (p 
& r) is true if and only if (p & q) is. As he writes,  
 
“Thus, the common metaphor in which we think of a conjunction as 
‘containing’ two ‘components’, p and q, is misleading. If an omelet contains 
eggs and cheese, for example, one cannot make the same omelet by keeping 
the eggs but putting in something other than cheese; but when it comes to 
propositions, one can get the same result (up to logical equivalence) by 
holding one ‘component’ constant and changing the other component,” (p. 
173)  
 
Huemer then shows that this general principle of logic can be applied to theories of 
knowledge. The point could be made more simply for some belief p by comparing 
some warrant condition φ(p) with some other warrant condition (p → φ( p)). However, 
so the reader will not think Huemer’s argument is entirely frivolous, one can make the 
same point by comparing the Standard Defeasibility Analysis of Knowledge (SDA) 
with the Modified Defeasibility Analysis (MDA) (cf. Huemer, pp. 173-174). Both 
analyses have the same first three conditions:  
 
S knows that p if and only if: 
(i) S believes that p; 
(ii) p is true; 
(iii) S is justified in believing that p 
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They differ in the fourth condition they add: 
  
(SDA): (iv) there are no (genuine) defeaters for p 
(MDA): (iv') there are no defeaters for p that are compatible with p 
 
The conjunction of (iii) and either (iv) or (iv') serves as the warrant property here. (iv) 
is logically stronger than (iv') and entails it. But the conjunction of (ii) and (iv') entails 
(iv) as well, because the truth of p means there are no true defeaters for p incompatible 
with p (such as not-p) and (iv') states that there are no defeaters for p compatible with p. 
Hence, if (ii) and (iv') are both true, there are no genuine defeaters for p, and (iv) must 
be true as well. Thus (SDA) and (MDA) give logically equivalent analyses of 
knowledge, despite possessing logically non-equivalent analyses of warrant.  
Additionally, Huemer gives a very simple argument in favor of warrant fallibilism, the 
view that a belief can be warranted and false at the same time. Even if some warrant 
property φ(p) entails the truth of p, then the alternative warrant property (p → φ(p)) 
does not entail the truth of p, because (p → φ(p)) is true whenever p is false. And if 
φ(p) does not entail the truth of p, then (p & φ(p)) does. This shows that warrant need 
not entail truth, but may do so, depending on minor alterations we might make to a 
given warrant property’s logical form. 
 
Huemer also derives a couple of results concerning the relationship between warrant 
and closure. Suppose that knowledge is closed under known logical entailment; in other 
words, if some agent S knows p and knows that p logically entails q, then S knows (or 
has all that it takes to know) q. Is warrant also closed under known logical entailment? 
Or rather, if S’s belief that p is warranted and S knows that p entails q, does it follow 
that q is warranted for S? Not necessarily, as Huemer shows (pp. 179-180). To see this, 
assume the following: 
 
1) φ(p) is a warrant property that is closed under known logical entailment. 
2) q is an unwarranted true belief. (This is a reasonable assumption, 
because not all true beliefs count as knowledge.) 
3) p is some false belief that entails the truth of q. (At a minimum, in 
classical logic every contradictory proposition entails the truth of everything 
else.) 
 
φ(p) and (p → φ(p)), as warrant properties, give logically equivalent analyses of 
knowledge. (p → φ(p)) is true, given the above three assumptions, because the 
antecedent is false, and thus p is warranted regardless of its level of plausibility. p 
entails q. But (q → φ(q)) is false, because the antecedent is true and the consequent is 
false. (We know φ(q) is false because q is a true belief, φ(q) is a warrant property for q, 
and we assumed at the outset that q was unwarranted, so that any true belief in q would 
not count as a piece of knowledge. Our warrant properties give logically equivalent 
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analyses of knowledge, so q will be unwarranted according to both of them.) Thus, the 
warrant property (p → φ(p)) is not closed under known logical entailment. 
 
On the other hand, if we assume that knowledge is closed under known logical 
entailment and that the warrant property φ(p) is not closed, then Huemer can 
demonstrate that there is another warrant property that is closed (pp. 179-180). Suppose 
that S knows p and knows that p entails q. Knowledge is closed, so S knows (or has all 
that it takes to know) q. If S knows (or has all that it takes to know) q, then φ(q) is true, 
according to our analysis of knowledge. We can reason the same way about any of p’s 
other known logical consequences. All of them will have φ, because S is in a position to 
know them and φ is a warrant property. Therefore, the warrant property (φ(p) and all of 
the known logical consequences of p have φ) gives a logically equivalent analysis of 
knowledge and is closed under known logical entailment. 
 
Lastly, Huemer shows that, assuming knowledge is not closed under logical entailment, 
neither is warrant (180). Since knowledge is warranted true belief, and truth is closed 
(by definition) under entailment, if knowledge is not closed, then it must be the case 
that either belief or warrant is not closed either. Epistemologists typically find it 
uninteresting to look at the cases where an agent fails to believe the logical entailment, 
so if we restrict ourselves to cases of known logical entailment (i.e., where the agent 
competently infers and believes q on the basis of p), then it must be the case that 
warrant is not closed.  
 
Although, as we have seen, Huemer offers a nonpartisan argument for warrant 
fallibilism, it receives scant attention from Coffman (2008)’s review of the warrant 
fallibilism/infallibilism debate. The reason seems to be that although Huemer’s logic is 
valid, there seems to be something illegitimate going on in the way he uses it to make 
his points. If φ(p) is a warrant property such that p is a warranted belief for an agent S, 
we clearly do not want propositions like (p → φ(p)) or (φ(p) v ~p) to count as warrant 
properties also. But why not? And how should we tighten our definition of warrant to 
exclude things such as (p → φ(p)) from consideration? Let us first see what Coffman 
has to say about the matter. His comments on Huemer are restricted to a long footnote, 
which says this: 
 
“Michael Huemer (2005) has recently shown that those discussing questions 
like the ones raised here should be more careful when fixing the reference of 
‘warrant’. Huemer argues that no feature is simply the one that yields 
knowledge when conjoined with true belief. Suppose there is some such 
feature, W. The fact that W exists entails that there is another property that 
yields knowledge when conjoined with true belief – viz., being false or 
having W. So, if there is a feature that yields knowledge when conjoined 
with true belief, then more than one feature does so: no property is the one 
that yields knowledge when conjoined with true belief. 
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In light of this argument, I propose the following: warrant is the (possibly 
logically complex) epistemically valuable feature that yields knowledge 
when conjoined with true belief – where a property is epistemically 
valuable iff its being exemplified entails the obtaining of an epistemically 
good or positive state of affairs. Because some false beliefs have no 
epistemically valuable features – e.g., a false belief grounded entirely in 
wishful thinking – no property that has being false as a disjunct qualifies as 
epistemically valuable (in the relevant sense).” (pp. 173-174)  
 
Howard-Snyder et al. (2003) also discuss the problems with a particular warrant-
property candidate, labeled (2) below, that has being false as a disjunct. It is intended to 
prevent Gettier cases – cases where one’s belief is accidentally true – from counting as 
pieces of knowledge. 
 
(2) S’s belief that p is warranted only if S’s belief that p is false or non-
accidentally true for S.  
 
If we let “being non-accidentally true” = φ(p), then (2) above is just (φ(p) v ~p). They 
write:  
 
It divides the cases into true and false beliefs. What it says about warranted 
true beliefs is helpful in understanding the nature of warrant: they must be 
nonaccidentaly true. But what it says about false beliefs is completely 
unhelpful. Any old completely unjustified and unreliably formed belief 
could meet this condition on warrant, so long as it was false. So this belief 
tells us nothing about the nature of warrant in the case of false belief.” (p. 
309) 
 
So for Howard-Snyder et al. the problem with a warrant condition that contains “being 
false” as a disjunct is that it tells us nothing about the nature of warrant, and the 
problem for Coffman is that such a warrant condition is not epistemically valuable.  
However, I do not find either of these responses to be a completely satisfactory answer. 
Since Huemer’s argument is based almost solely upon the formal manipulation of 
logical propositions, ideally, I would like to eliminate warrant conditions such as (φ(p) 
v ~p) strictly on the basis of some aspect of their logical form. Note that even if 
Howard-Snyder et al.’s arguments succeeded in ruling out (φ(p) v ~p) as a possible 
warrant condition, they would not rule out other possible conditions, such (p → φ(p)) or 
(p & φ(p)). 
 
The warrant condition (φ(p) v ~p) has “being false” as a disjunct. Indeed, this seems to 
tell us nothing about the nature of warrant in the case of false belief, but that is because 
there’s nothing to tell. Our stipulative definition of warrant says nothing about what it 
would mean for a belief to be both warranted and false at the same time. No false belief 
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counts as a piece of knowledge, nor could so count without somehow becoming true, so 
it is simply vacuous to say, of a false belief, that it is warranted. It implies nothing new 
about the belief. Thus attempts to offer nonpartisan arguments for and against warrant 
infallibilism seem at least slightly misguided. Granted, if such an argument were to 
succeed, it would spell disaster for any substantive theories of knowledge that had 
incompatible warrant conditions, but most such arguments, being based on intuitions 
rather than logical manipulation, seem doomed to failure. Since being both warranted 
and false is vacuous, according to our definition of warrant, we are not entitled to infer, 
from the fact that a given true belief is warranted (or unwarranted), that it would be 
warranted (or unwarranted) were it to become false. We also have no grounds, prior to 
giving an analysis of knowledge, for knowing which epistemic properties warrant 
supervenes over, or whether warrant remains the same despite the changes that affect 
the truth-value of a belief between nearby possible worlds.  
  
As for Coffman, I do not think our definition of warrant should have notions of 
epistemic value built in. An analysis of knowledge should give us the truth-conditions 
for determining when we have knowledge and when we don’t, and warrant is one part 
of those truth-conditions. Most of us are intuitively inclined to think that knowledge is 
valuable in various ways, but it seems to me we do not want our analysis of knowledge 
to beg such questions. What we also need, in addition to that analysis and separate from 
it, is an understanding why knowledge is valuable or important enough to bother 
analyzing in the first place. 
 
To return to Huemer’s arguments, I think the real problem with warrant conditions such 
as (p & φ(p)) is that they are redundant in some way. I tend to think of knowledge like 
an omelet, as having component parts, rather than as the product of any of a number of 
sets of complex but logically equivalent propositions. If I have eggs already and want to 
know what else I need to make the omelet, I want to be told “cheese,” not “cheese plus 
the eggs you already have.” 
 
How can I cash out this notion of non-redundancy? Perhaps we can measure 
redundancy for some set of propositions K in terms of the number of members of K or 
their denials which are entailed by other members of K or their denials. ‘φ(p)’ is 
obviously less redundant than ‘(p → φ(p))’, given a set K containing ‘p,’ because ‘p’ 
and ‘φ(p)’ entail nothing about each other while the falsity of ‘p’ entails the truth of ‘(p 
→ φ(p)).’ ‘φ(p)’ is completely logically independent of ‘p.’ (Of course, it may not be so 
in reality, as for all we know pre-theoretically, some substantive theory of knowledge 
that entails warrant infallibilism could be correct. If so, ‘φ(p)’ is just a cover term for 
some logically complex relation which ‘p’ does entail.) Any increase in the redundancy 
or logical complexity of the warrant condition should be offset by theoretical advances 
necessitating that increase.  
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Lastly, suppose that we try to modify our definition of warrant so that it does imply 
something about warranted false beliefs. Modalizing (1) above in the following way 
seems to be one way we could do this: 
 
(3) A true belief would count as a piece of knowledge iff it were warranted. 
A warranted belief would count as a piece of knowledge iff it were true. 
 
If we make this move, we force ourselves to say something substantive about the nature 
of warrant in order to understand (3), and we also increase the likelihood that this 
definition may not in fact correctly capture whatever makes the difference between 
knowledge and mere true belief. But it might be worth the effort nonetheless. Let’s 
examine the case of some false belief which, supposedly, would count as a piece of 
knowledge if it were true. Suppose that Betty has all of the alarming symptoms of zebra 
pox. She has sought a second and third medical opinion, and all of her reliable doctors 
agree on the diagnosis: it’s a bad case of zebra pox, all right. Thus, Betty competently 
infers that she has zebra pox. In fact, Betty actually has mule pox, an extremely rare 
disease with similar symptoms. If Betty’s belief that she has zebra pox is warranted 
according to (3), then seemingly it must be the case that in most of the nearby possible 
worlds around Betty, her belief is true, and Betty is just very unlucky to be in a world 
where her belief is false. But beliefs can be true accidentally or non-accidentally, so it 
seems the non-accidentally-true-zebra-pox worlds must have some kind of advantage 
over their accidentally-true cousins, in terms of nearness to Betty or numerical 
superiority or both. One accidentally-true-zebra-pox-world is the world where Betty’s 
doctors misdiagnose her mule pox as zebra pox, but Betty also has recently acquired a 
zebra pox infection that has not yet produced any symptoms of its own. I presume that 
world stands at a disadvantage compared to the non-accidentally-true-zebra-pox 
worlds. In the accidentally-true-zebra-pox-world itself, of course, Betty’s belief is not 
warranted; that was the lesson of the Gettier problem. 
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